Tor Dark Web: Navigating Safely in 2026

What 'Tor Dark Web' Actually Means in 2026

Tor is the network and browser you use to reach hidden .onion sites—it is not the dark web itself. The Tor Browser routes your traffic through three randomly selected servers (relays) before it reaches its destination[1]. Each relay adds a layer of encryption, so someone watching your connection cannot see what you send into the Tor network or which site you visit[5]. Your ISP sees only that you connected to Tor, not the names or addresses of the websites you open[1].

The three relays work in sequence:

• Entry node (or guard relay) receives your encrypted request but does not know the final destination.

• Middle relay passes the traffic onward, seeing neither your IP address nor the destination.

• Exit node sends your request to the public Internet or delivers it to a .onion site, but cannot trace it back to you.

This layered design is why the project is called 'The Onion Routing'—named by Roger Dingledine in the early 2000s when he and Paul Syverson built on U.S. Naval Research Lab prototypes from the mid-1990s[6]. The network went live in October 2002 with about a dozen volunteer nodes by the end of 2003[6], and the Tor Project became a nonprofit in 2006[6].

.onion sites exist only inside the Tor network; standard search engines do not index them, and you cannot open them in Chrome or Firefox. Tor Browser is the access tool, not the destination. If you sign in to any website with your real name or email—even over Tor—you are no longer anonymous to that site, though it still cannot see your physical location[4]. Tor protects only the applications configured to use it; running Tor Browser does not anonymise your other programs[4].

The Tor Project states that perfect anonymity is impossible, even with Tor[4]. You remain safer than browsing without protection, but you must understand what Tor does and what it cannot do. How to Access the Dark Web: A Step-by-Step Guide walks through the download and first-run setup.

Before You Open Tor: Baseline Security Setup

You need to prepare your system before you launch Tor Browser for the first time. Skipping these steps leaves gaps that can expose your real IP address or link your Tor activity to your identity.

Update your operating system. Security patches close vulnerabilities that malware or an attacker could exploit to bypass Tor's protections. Run all available updates for your OS and reboot if required.

Download Tor Browser only from the official site at https://download.torproject.org/[3]. The current stable release is Tor Browser 16.0[3]. Each download package includes an OpenPGP signature file with the '.asc' extension; verify this signature to confirm the file has not been modified by an attacker[2]. The Tor Project provides instructions for signature verification on the download page.

Consider a dedicated user profile or virtual machine. If you use the same OS profile for banking, social media, and Tor, a single misconfigured application can leak identifying information. A separate user account or VM isolates your Tor session from your everyday browsing habits and installed software.

Set Tor Browser's Security Level before you visit any site. Open Tor Browser, click the shield icon in the toolbar, and choose Settings. You will see three levels:

• Standard enables all browser features, including JavaScript.

• Safer disables JavaScript on non-HTTPS sites and blocks some fonts and symbols.

• Safest disables JavaScript on all sites, along with video, audio, and certain fonts[1].

JavaScript can reveal your real IP address or fingerprint your browser if a site is malicious or compromised. Start with Safest until you understand the trade-offs; many .onion sites function without JavaScript.

Never sign in to personal accounts. If you log into Facebook, Gmail, or any service tied to your real identity, you are no longer anonymous to that website, even though it still cannot see your location[4]. Tor protects your connection, not your behaviour. Treat every Tor session as if you are a different person with no link to your offline life.

What happens if you skip these steps: a conditional scenario. Suppose you open Tor Browser on an unpatched Windows installation, leave Security Level at Standard, and visit a .onion forum. A malicious script on the forum exploits an unpatched browser vulnerability, retrieves your real IP address from a WebRTC leak, and posts it publicly. Your ISP logs show you connected to Tor at that exact time, and the forum timestamp matches. You are now identifiable. This scenario is not hypothetical fearmongering—WebRTC and JavaScript leaks have deanonymised Tor users in the past when protections were disabled or misconfigured.

The Tor Project strongly discourages routing other browsers through Tor, because doing so exposes you to serious risks of deanonymisation and information leakage[1]. Use only Tor Browser for Tor traffic.

Installing and Verifying Tor Browser Correctly

Download Tor Browser only from the official Tor Project site at https://download.torproject.org/[3]. The current stable release is Tor Browser 16.0, with packages available for Windows, macOS, GNU/Linux, and Android[3]. Third-party download mirrors, bundled 'Tor packages' from unknown sources, and app stores other than the official repositories can serve modified versions that log your traffic or inject malware. You cannot verify what code runs inside an unofficial build.

Verify the Package Signature

Each download package on the Tor Project site includes an OpenPGP signature file with the '.asc' extension[2]. This signature lets you confirm the file is exactly what the developers created and has not been modified by an attacker[2]. The Tor Project provides step-by-step instructions for GPG signature verification on the download page; follow them before you run the installer. If you skip verification, you trust that your connection was not intercepted and that the server was not compromised. Signature verification removes that assumption.

If GPG feels too complex for your first install, check the file's SHA-256 checksum against the one published on the Tor Project site. A mismatch means the file was altered; delete it and download again over a different network.

Install and Launch

Run the installer for your operating system. Tor Browser installs as a standalone application; it does not modify your system browser or require administrator privileges on most platforms. Once installed, open Tor Browser. You will see the first-run connection screen with two buttons: Connect and Configure.

• Connect starts Tor immediately using the default public relays. Choose this if your ISP does not block Tor and you are not in a country that censors the network.

• Configure opens the bridge settings. Choose this if Tor is blocked in your location or if you want to hide the fact that you are using Tor from your ISP.

When to Use Bridges

A bridge is a Tor relay not listed in the public directory, so an ISP or government firewall cannot easily block it by IP address. If you click Configure, Tor Browser will offer built-in bridge types (obfs4, Snowflake, meek-azure) or let you enter a custom bridge address. Bridges add one extra hop before your traffic enters the main Tor network, slightly increasing latency but allowing you to connect when direct access is blocked.

You do not need a bridge if Tor connects successfully with the Connect button. Adding a bridge when you do not need one makes your connection slower without improving anonymity. If you are unsure whether Tor is blocked, try Connect first; if it fails after 60 seconds, restart and choose Configure to add a bridge.

How to Download Tor: A Step-by-Step Guide covers platform-specific installation details and troubleshooting connection failures.

Navigating .onion Sites Without Exposing Yourself

.onion addresses exist only inside the Tor network and look like random strings of letters and numbers followed by '.onion'—for example, a 56-character address ending in '.onion' for a v3 service. You cannot type them into Chrome or Firefox; you need Tor Browser. These addresses are not human-readable by design, and many sites change their .onion URL periodically to evade takedowns or migrate infrastructure. You will not remember them, and you cannot guess them.

Finding .onion Addresses Safely

Do not click random .onion links posted in forums, chat rooms, or social media. Anyone can create a .onion site, and many exist solely to phish credentials, distribute malware, or log visitor IP addresses through browser exploits. Instead, use trusted directories and indexes that curate known services:

• The Hidden Wiki and similar curated lists provide categories of .onion sites, but treat every link as unverified until you confirm it through a second source.

• Onion service search engines (such as Ahmia or Torch) index .onion content, but results can include phishing clones and scam sites alongside legitimate services.

• Official clearnet pages of known projects often publish their .onion address; for example, news organisations and privacy tools list their .onion mirror on their main website.

Cross-check any .onion address you find. If a directory lists an address for a known service, search for that service's official clearnet site and verify the .onion address matches. One character difference in a 56-character string can send you to a phishing clone.

Phishing Clones and Typosquatting

Attackers register .onion addresses that mimic popular services by changing one or two characters—'3' instead of '8', 'rn' instead of 'm'. A conditional example: suppose you want to visit a known .onion marketplace and you find a link on a forum. The real address ends in 'a7x3.onion', but the forum link ends in 'a7x8.onion'. You click it, see a login page that looks identical to the real site, and enter credentials. The fake site now has your username and password, and if you reuse that password elsewhere, the attacker can access those accounts too. You have no legal recourse, because you cannot identify who ran the fake site or where they are located.

Check every character of an .onion address before you bookmark it. Save verified addresses in Tor Browser's bookmarks, and never rely on a link from an untrusted source. If a site asks for a login, a payment, or personal information, confirm the .onion address through at least two independent sources before you proceed.

Dark Web Market Place: Navigating Safely explains how to verify marketplace addresses and recognise common phishing tactics.

Common Mistakes That Break Anonymity

Tor Browser protects your connection, but common configuration errors and habits can expose your real identity or location[4]. The Tor Project states that 'generally it is impossible to have perfect anonymity, even with Tor'[4], and most deanonymisation cases involve user mistakes rather than flaws in the network itself. Below are documented mistakes that break anonymity and how to avoid each one.

Maximising the Tor Browser Window

When you maximise Tor Browser to fill your screen, websites can read your exact screen resolution through JavaScript. This resolution becomes part of your browser fingerprint—a unique signature that can link your Tor sessions together or distinguish you from other Tor users. Tor Browser ships with a default window size designed to match thousands of other users; resizing it makes you stand out.

How to avoid it: Leave Tor Browser at its default size. If you need more space, increase the zoom level (Ctrl and + on Windows/Linux, Cmd and + on macOS) instead of dragging the window edges. Tor Browser is specifically developed to resist browser fingerprinting[1], but this protection only works if you do not override the default dimensions.

Enabling Plugins or Extensions

Tor Browser disables most plugins by default, and the Tor Project strongly discourages adding extensions[1]. Plugins such as Flash, Java, and QuickTime can execute code outside Tor's control, leaking your real IP address or sending identifying information to third parties. Browser extensions—even privacy-focused ones—can fingerprint your configuration, inject tracking scripts, or create a unique identifier that persists across sessions.

How to avoid it: Do not install any extensions in Tor Browser. If a website demands Flash or Java, leave the site; it is not designed for anonymous access. Tor Browser includes NoScript, HTTPS Everywhere, and other protections by default[1]. Adding more tools does not improve anonymity—it creates new attack surfaces.

Opening Downloaded Files Whilst Online

PDFs, Word documents, and other files can contain embedded scripts, external links, or metadata that connect to the Internet when you open them. If you download a PDF over Tor and open it in Adobe Reader whilst Tor Browser is running, Adobe Reader may fetch remote fonts or images over your regular Internet connection, bypassing Tor entirely and revealing your real IP address to the server hosting those resources.

How to avoid it: Disconnect from the Internet before you open any file downloaded through Tor, or open files inside a virtual machine with no network access. Better still, avoid downloading files over Tor unless absolutely necessary. If you must download a document, use a text-only viewer or convert the file to plain text before you open it. Tor only protects applications that are properly configured to send their traffic through Tor[4]; your PDF reader is not one of them.

Using the Same Identity Across Clearnet and Dark Web

If you log into your Gmail account in Chrome, then open Tor Browser and visit a .onion forum using the same username, email address, or writing style, you have linked your real identity to your Tor activity. Even if you do not use the same credentials, behavioural patterns—posting times, topics of interest, phrasing—can correlate your accounts. If you sign in to a website over Tor or provide name, email, address, phone number, or any other personal information, you are no longer anonymous to that website even though it still does not know your location[4].

How to avoid it: Create entirely separate identities for Tor. Use a unique username, a disposable email address (or no email at all), and a different writing style. Do not mention personal details, your city, your job, or anything that appears in your social media profiles. Treat your Tor identity as a fictional character with no connection to your offline life. If you must register on a .onion site, use a random username generator and never reuse it elsewhere.

Sending Personal Information Over HTTP .onion Sites

HTTPS encrypts the connection between your browser and a website, preventing anyone who intercepts the traffic from reading or modifying it. Many .onion sites use only HTTP, assuming that Tor's encryption is sufficient. Tor does encrypt your traffic between your computer and the exit relay[5], but if the .onion site itself uses HTTP, a malicious relay or anyone who compromises the site's server can read everything you send: passwords, messages, payment details.

How to avoid it: Check the address bar before you enter any sensitive information. Tor Browser displays a padlock icon for HTTPS connections. If you see 'http://' with no padlock, do not submit passwords, credit card numbers, or personal data. Many legitimate .onion services now offer HTTPS; if a site does not, question whether it is worth the risk. Tor Browser's HTTPS-only mode (enabled at Security Level Safer and Safest) blocks HTTP sites by default, forcing you to make a conscious choice to proceed.

Using Tor Over a Compromised VPN or Vice Versa

The Tor Project generally does not recommend using a VPN with Tor unless you are an advanced user, because combining a VPN with Tor can reduce anonymity or break Tor's protections if not configured correctly[7]. If you connect to a VPN before Tor (VPN → Tor), your VPN provider sees that you are using Tor, and the Tor entry node sees the VPN's IP address instead of yours. If the VPN logs your activity or is compromised, an attacker can link your Tor sessions to your real identity. If you connect to Tor before a VPN (Tor → VPN), the VPN sees all your traffic after it leaves Tor, and you must trust the VPN not to log or tamper with it.

How to avoid it: Use Tor alone unless you have a specific, documented reason to add a VPN and you understand the configuration trade-offs. If your ISP blocks Tor, use a bridge instead of a VPN How to Access the Dark Web: A Step-by-Step Guide. If you must use a VPN, choose one with a verified no-logs policy, pay with cryptocurrency or cash, and never log into the VPN account using your real email or payment details. Most users do not need a VPN with Tor, and adding one incorrectly creates more risk than it removes.

Reusing Tor Circuits or Identities

Tor Browser assigns you a new circuit (a path through three relays) for each website you visit, but it reuses circuits for the same site to improve performance. If you visit multiple .onion sites in one session, they can share circuits, and a malicious site could correlate your activity across those sites by timing analysis. Closing and reopening Tor Browser gives you a completely new identity, but many users stay in the same session for hours, accumulating a trail of linked activity.

How to avoid it: Use Tor Browser's New Identity feature (click the broom icon in the toolbar) to close all tabs, clear cookies, and request a new circuit. Do this between unrelated tasks—for example, after you finish reading news and before you visit a forum. Restart Tor Browser entirely if you need maximum separation. Each restart gives you a fresh entry guard and no shared state with your previous session. Your anonymity improves when you treat each task as a separate, unlinked event.

What Tor Does Not Protect You From

Tor hides who you are and where you are, but it does not hide what you say if the destination is not HTTPS[1]. The Tor network routes your traffic through three random relays[1], encrypting each hop so that no single relay knows both your identity and your destination[5]. This design protects you from local surveillance and website tracking, but it leaves gaps that attackers and law enforcement exploit. Understanding these gaps helps you decide what you can safely do over Tor and what requires additional precautions.

Exit Node Eavesdropping on Unencrypted Traffic

The exit relay—the last server in your Tor circuit—sends your traffic out onto the public Internet[1]. If you visit an HTTP site (no padlock icon in the address bar), the exit relay operator can read everything you send: passwords, messages, search queries. Tor encrypts the connection between your computer and the exit relay, but it cannot encrypt traffic between the exit relay and the destination if that site does not use HTTPS.

A conditional example: suppose you visit an HTTP forum over Tor and post a message that includes your real name. The exit relay operator logs the message, sees your username, and records the .onion address of the forum. Later, law enforcement seizes the exit relay's logs. They now have your message, your username, and the time you posted it. If you used the same username elsewhere or mentioned identifying details, they can link your Tor activity to your real identity.

What to do: Only visit HTTPS sites when you enter sensitive information. Tor Browser's Security Level Safer and Safest enable HTTPS-only mode by default, blocking HTTP sites unless you explicitly allow them. If a site does not offer HTTPS, assume that someone is reading your traffic.

Malicious .onion Services

.onion sites are not vetted or regulated. Anyone can create a .onion service, and many exist solely to steal credentials, distribute malware, or log visitor behaviour. A malicious .onion site can serve you a fake login page, record your username and password, then redirect you to the real site so you never notice. It can embed JavaScript that attempts to fingerprint your browser or exploit a vulnerability in Tor Browser. It can log your activity and correlate it with other visits if you return to the same site later.

What to do: Verify every .onion address through at least two independent sources before you visit it. Bookmark verified addresses and never click links from untrusted forums or social media. Set Tor Browser's Security Level to Safest for .onion sites you do not fully trust; this disables JavaScript and reduces the attack surface. If a .onion site asks for personal information or payment, treat it with the same scepticism you would apply to an unsigned email attachment.

Correlation Attacks by Global Adversaries

Tor protects you from an attacker who watches only one part of your connection—your ISP, the website, or a single relay. It does not protect you from an adversary who can monitor both your Internet connection and the destination at the same time. If an organisation controls your entry relay and the exit relay (or the website you visit), it can correlate the timing and volume of traffic entering Tor with the timing and volume leaving Tor. This 'end-to-end correlation attack' does not break Tor's encryption, but it does not need to; the attacker simply matches patterns to link your real IP address to your Tor activity.

The Tor Project acknowledges that 'generally it is impossible to have perfect anonymity, even with Tor'[4]. Correlation attacks require significant resources—monitoring large portions of the Internet, controlling multiple relays, or compelling ISPs to hand over logs—so they are typically within reach of nation-state actors and large law enforcement agencies, not individual criminals. Documented cases of deanonymisation have focused on operational mistakes (reusing identities, opening files whilst online, logging into personal accounts) rather than breaking Tor's encryption.

What to do: Assume that a sufficiently motivated global adversary can correlate your traffic if you give them enough data points. Limit your Tor sessions to short, focused tasks. Use the New Identity feature between unrelated activities. Do not visit the same .onion site repeatedly over weeks; patterns emerge from repetition. If your threat model includes nation-state surveillance, consider that Tor alone may not be sufficient, and consult legal or technical experts before you proceed.

Human Error

Most deanonymisation cases result from mistakes you make outside Tor Browser. You log into your Gmail account in Tor Browser. You mention your city in a forum post. You download a PDF, open it in Adobe Reader whilst online, and Adobe fetches a remote font over your regular connection, leaking your real IP address. You reuse a username from your Twitter profile. You maximise Tor Browser, exposing your screen resolution. You install a VPN without understanding that it can log your Tor traffic or break your circuit.

Law enforcement focuses on exit nodes and operational mistakes, not breaking Tor's encryption. Agencies run exit relays to monitor unencrypted HTTP traffic, seize servers hosting .onion sites to identify visitors through timing analysis, and subpoena ISPs for logs when a suspect makes a mistake that links their Tor activity to their real identity. The technology works; the weak point is you.

What to do: Follow every guideline in this article. Treat each one as a hard rule, not a suggestion. Tor protects your connection, but it cannot protect you from yourself. If you are unsure whether an action is safe, assume it is not and ask for advice in a privacy-focused community before you proceed.

Legal Context: What Is and Isn't Illegal

Using Tor Browser is legal in most countries, including the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. Downloading the software from the official Tor Project site[3], installing it, and browsing .onion sites does not break any law in these jurisdictions. The Tor network was developed with funding from the U.S. Naval Research Lab and the Electronic Frontier Foundation[6], and it remains a legitimate tool for journalists, activists, researchers, and anyone who values privacy. Your ISP can see that you are connecting to the Tor network, but it cannot see what you do inside it[1], and simply using Tor does not give law enforcement grounds to investigate you.

What makes Tor use illegal is the activity you engage in, not the tool itself. Accessing child sexual abuse material (CSAM), purchasing controlled substances, hiring someone to commit a crime, distributing copyrighted content without authorisation, or facilitating fraud are crimes regardless of whether you use Tor, a regular browser, or no Internet connection at all. Tor hides your location and identity, but it does not create a legal exemption. If you commit a crime over Tor, you face the same penalties as if you committed it in person or over the clearnet.

What is legal:

• Browsing .onion sites for news, forums, or privacy-focused services.

• Reading documentation, research papers, or whistleblower platforms hosted on .onion addresses.

• Using Tor to protect your privacy when you travel, work on a public Wi-Fi network, or live in a country with surveillance.

• Accessing clearnet sites through Tor to prevent tracking by advertisers, ISPs, or governments.

What is illegal:

• Viewing, downloading, or distributing CSAM, even if you claim you did so 'accidentally'.

• Purchasing illegal drugs, weapons, stolen data, or counterfeit documents from dark web marketplaces.

• Participating in hacking forums where members share exploits, stolen credentials, or malware.

• Threatening, harassing, or inciting violence against individuals or groups.

Documented cases of arrest show that users were identified through operational mistakes, not by breaking Tor's encryption. A conditional example: suppose you visit a dark web marketplace over Tor, create an account with a username you have used on Twitter, and later log into that Twitter account from your home IP address. Law enforcement seizes the marketplace server, extracts the username list, searches social media for matches, and links your Tor activity to your real identity. Tor protected your connection, but your reused username gave you away.

Countries That Restrict or Ban Tor

Some countries block access to the Tor network or criminalise its use. China, Iran, Russia, Belarus, and Turkmenistan actively filter Tor connections, forcing users to rely on bridges—unlisted entry relays that ISPs cannot easily detect. In these jurisdictions, using Tor may attract scrutiny from authorities even if you are not breaking any other law. Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have intermittently blocked Tor, and Saudi Arabia monitors Tor traffic without fully blocking it.

Check your local law before you use Tor if you live in or travel to a country with Internet censorship. The Tor Project does not maintain a definitive list of countries where Tor is illegal, because legal status changes frequently and enforcement varies by region. If your country blocks Tor, you can still connect using a bridge How to Access the Dark Web: A Step-by-Step Guide, but be aware that using circumvention tools may itself be a legal risk depending on local statutes.

Liability for Exit Node Operators

Running a Tor relay is legal in the UK and most Western countries, but operating an exit relay—the final hop that sends traffic out onto the public Internet—carries legal risk. Exit relay operators have been investigated, had equipment seized, and received complaints from copyright holders, law enforcement, and abuse desks because their IP address appears in server logs when someone uses Tor to commit a crime or download copyrighted material. The Tor Project provides legal resources for relay operators, and most cases are resolved without charges, but the process is disruptive and expensive.

You are not legally responsible for traffic that passes through your relay if you operate it in good faith and do not monitor or modify the traffic. However, you should expect that law enforcement will contact you at some point if you run an exit relay. If you want to support the Tor network without this risk, run a middle relay or a bridge instead; these do not send traffic directly to websites, so they do not appear in server logs.

Browsing .onion sites as an ordinary user does not make you an exit relay operator, and you are not liable for traffic from other Tor users. This section applies only if you choose to run your own relay to help the network.

Quick Safety Checklist for Every Session

Before you open Tor Browser, run through this checklist. Print it, bookmark it, or keep it open in a separate window until the routine becomes automatic. Each step addresses a specific risk documented in earlier sections, and skipping even one can expose your identity or compromise your device.

Before you connect:

1. Update Tor Browser. Open the application, wait for the update prompt, and install any available version before you browse. Outdated software contains known vulnerabilities that attackers exploit on .onion sites.

2. Close other applications. Shut down your regular browser, email client, messaging apps, and any software that connects to the Internet. Tor only protects traffic routed through Tor Browser; other applications can leak your real IP address[4].

3. Set Security Level to Safest. Click the shield icon in the toolbar, select 'Settings', and choose 'Safest'. This disables JavaScript, blocks some fonts and images, and reduces the attack surface on untrusted .onion sites.

4. Use a bridge if Tor is blocked. If your ISP or government filters Tor connections, configure a bridge in the connection settings before you connect. This hides the fact that you are using Tor from anyone monitoring your network.

During your session:

5. Do not maximise the window. Leave Tor Browser at its default size to prevent fingerprinting based on your screen resolution[1].

6. Do not log into personal accounts. Signing into Gmail, Facebook, or any service linked to your real identity makes you no longer anonymous to that website, even though it still does not know your location[4].

7. Do not download or open files whilst online. PDFs, Word documents, and images can contain scripts that fetch remote resources over your regular connection, bypassing Tor. Download files only if you trust the source, then disconnect from the Internet and open them offline.

8. Verify .onion addresses. Check every .onion link through at least two independent sources before you visit it. Bookmark verified addresses and never click links from forums or social media.

After you finish:

9. Use New Identity between unrelated activities. Click the broom icon in the toolbar to clear cookies, close all tabs, and request a new Tor circuit. This prevents websites from linking your sessions.

10. Disconnect and close Tor Browser. Quit the application completely, not just the window. If you leave Tor Browser running in the background, it can still leak information through open connections.

Follow this checklist every time you use Tor. The technology protects your connection, but it cannot protect you from mistakes you make outside the browser[4].

Conclusions

• Tor routes your traffic through three relays and hides what you browse from your ISP, but it doesn't make you anonymous if you sign into personal accounts or reuse usernames across sites.

• First action for every session: update Tor Browser, set the shield icon's Security Level to Safest, and close all other Internet-connected apps before you connect.

• Keep the window at its default size and avoid downloads or opening files while online; enable bridges only if your network blocks Tor and check local rules first.

• Use New Identity between unrelated activities, and never run an exit relay unless you accept possible legal contact.

Your first next step is to update Tor Browser and set Security Level to Safest, then work through How to Access the Dark Web: A Step-by-Step Guide to verify each .onion address before visiting it.